And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness. [Utilitarianism, Chapter 4]
The problem is that virtue’s cultivation can to all appearances countermand any prior semblance of happiness as goal —even to the point of shame at the thought. Mill’s positivistic plea is pitched lower. He must be deeply impressed with the fact that the mass of humanity is so far removed from the higher reaches of virtue (or any virtue at all) that to urge them to go anywhere near it he must link it to a tangible hedonism. If so, he is engaged in what is really applied ethics, as witnessed by his willingness to sacrifice something of the truth for the sake of widespread intelligibility. We do not entirely blame him for this —except that he offers a resting place in moral thought that is precarious, unstable and fated to supersession. As such —and however necessary —it has served for many as distraction.