In the case of this [the “powerful sentiment” back of the idea of justice], as of our other moral sentiments, there is no necessary connection between the question of its origin, and that of its binding force. That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings.
But a theory that does not contend with what has been bestowed upon us cannot be seen as applying to us except in fancy.
The feeling of justice might be a peculiar instinct, and might yet require, like our other instincts, to be controlled and enlightened by a higher reason. [Utilitarianism, Chapter 5]
The concept of “higher reason” here begs the question, for many philosophers as diverse as Hume and Weininger have assumed that Reason (presumably, the highest) is utterly indifferent to human concerns and, perforce, to concerns of utility. But to retreat to a more human-friendly “reason,” a normative, biased reason, is to enter the fray on a par with sentiments of all sorts—justice, compassion, etc. among them.